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There  is  potential  for  over-provision  of  environmental  harms  and  under-provision  of  environmental 
benefits associated with GM crops. As a result, strong public regulation is needed to ensure that full social 
values  are  considered.  However,  one  reason  for  opposition  to  GM  crops  is  a  lack  of  public  trust  in 
regulatory institutions and science, and the limited opportunities afforded to public-participation and non-
scientific concerns. We aim to demonstrate the trade-off between social cost and managing the risks of 
gene  flow  arising  from  environmental  release  of  GM  canola  in  Australia,  using  the  framework  of  a 
probabilistic risk assessment and safety-rule decision mechanism. 
 




Biotechnology has been described as the next great wave of technological change, yet genetically modified 
crops (GM crops) are often described as a continuum of the husbandry techniques used in thousands of 
years  of  agriculture.  Broadly  defined,  biotechnology  refers  to  the  use  of  biological  processes  for 
commercial purposes (Polya 1999). On the other hand, modern biotechnology or gene technology describes 
the newly developed processes of molecular biology used to insert relatively few genes into an organism’s 
genome to form new combinations of genetic material (Tester 2001).  
 
Despite rapid development and global adoption of GM crops, and despite assurances by proponents of gene 
technology, public opinion does not accept GM crops as an extension of familiar agricultural products and 
conventional  crop  improvement  techniques  (Jackson  and  Villinski  2002).  Instead,  public  responses  to 
agricultural gene technology are seen as part of a wider shift in social attitudes to viewing technology and 
scientific advances as a cause rather than a solution to social problems. Focus groups assessing Australian 
attitudes towards GM crops reflect this observation, as well as mistrust of the profit motive underlying 
biotechnology research and the independence of the Australian Gene Technology Regulator (Dietrich and 
Schibeci 2003). Although such concerns have not proven an insurmountable barrier to commercialisation 













In this paper we outline a mechanism for public participation in the regulatory process in Australia, using 
the framework of a probabilistic risk assessment and safety-rule decision mechanism. Advantages of this 
framework include its explicit treatment of uncertainty and its emphasis on the policy parameters, namely 
acceptable risk and the margin of safety. In the next section we discuss the relevance of our case study, GM 
herbicide tolerant canola, and then we outline some applications of the safety rule decision mechanism 




A significant objection to the Australian system to regulate gene technology, the Gene Technology Act 
2000 (Cth) (the GT Act), is the prominence given to science-based risk assessment. The Gene Technology 
Regulator’s
1 decision to approve commercial release of GM herbicide tolerant canola is a case in point. 
Although the Regulator determined that the risks posed by GM canola were no greater than those of non-
GM canola, her decision was criticised for excluding consideration of socio-economic and philosophical 
objections to gene technology. This exclusion is according to the scope of the risk assessment procedures 
under the GT Act. However, Lawson (2002) has argued that the decision to allow environmental release of 
GM canola (or any genetically modified organism) was the outcome of the type of value-judgements the 
GT Act intended to exclude. Having accepted the possibility of adverse consequences from environmental 
release,  the  Regulator’s  decision  to  approve  release  implied  that  she  considers  those  consequences 
acceptable, and that the benefits of GM canola exceed the costs. Lawson and Hindmarsh (2006) have also 
argued that the Regulator makes a further value-judgement in setting the threshold value for unacceptable 
risks, and in deciding that risks below the threshold value are acceptable.  
 
A significant concern over environmental release is whether conventional and organic cropping systems 
(including non-canola cropping systems) can co-exist with GM canola. Contamination of non-GM canola 
on-farm is a hazard associated with the risk of gene flow to wild or weedy relatives and non-GM canola. 























Gene flow is the natural process of the movement of genes between individual organisms. In plants this 
occurs mainly by pollen from one plant successfully cross-pollinating a flower on another plant, which in 
turn produces a viable seed (Glover 2002). It is certain that 100% effective segregation of GM and non-GM 
canola is impossible, and likewise a zero tolerance threshold for adventitious presence of GM material in 
organic produce (Brookes 2004), which may block access to some markets. There are also potential hazards 
for agricultural and natural ecosystems as a result of gene flow from GM canola. Because canola belongs to 
the Brassicaceae family, which includes species that are agricultural weeds in most states, the likelihood of 
hybrid formation with weedy or wild relatives is an issue. A potential consequences of crop-to-wild relative 
gene flow is loss of biodiversity, especially if the wild species is rare (Messeguer 2003). However, crop-to-
crop gene flow may lead to greater agricultural risks than those from the movement of transgenes for 
herbicide tolerance to wild relatives (Ellstrand 2001). One hazard that has already been realised is volunteer 
canola plants stacked with transgenes for resistance to more than one herbicide. 
 
Canola (Brassica napus) is predominantly self-fertilising, but it has some potential for out-crossing, and it 
is on account of this attribute that gene flow from GM canola has the potential to impact farm or local 
environments in Australia. The frequency of hybrid formation between canola and the most significant 
agricultural weeds is low and the impact depends on the transgene and the trait it encodes as well as the 
environment of the recipient plant. However, estimates of potential rates of crop-to-crop out-crossing vary 
around 30%. Research shows pollen dispersal follows a leptokurtic distribution with most pollen travelling 
less than 10 metres from its source. However, wind and insect borne pollen have been found at distances of 
1.5km  and  4km,  respectively  (Salisbury  2002)  and  Australian  studies  show  a  more  variable  pollen 
distribution (Rieger et al. 2002).  
 
Complete  containment  of  transgenes  is  both  impractical  and  impossible;  therefore  strategies  to  keep 
containment  within  certain  thresholds  include  isolation  distances  and  rows  of  refuge  crop.  Isolation 
distances of 4km have been proposed to prevent unwanted out-crossing on a commercial scale (Timmons et 
al.  (1996)  in  Downey  1999),  while  the  UK  Supply  Chain  Initiative  on  Modified  Agricultural  Crops 
(SCIMAC) guidelines specify a precautionary approach of 50m for non-GM canola, and 200m for certified 
canola  seed  crops  and  registered  organic  canola  (Brookes  2004).  Otherwise,  recommended  isolation 
distances for contamination thresholds range from 1.5 to 30 metres for a less than 1% threshold of seed 
purity, 10-120 metres for 0.5% seed purity, and 100-400 metres for a less than 0.1% threshold (Salisbury 
2002). However, Kareiva and Marvier (2000) note that barren zones can increase the mean amount or 
distance of gene flow out of plots, and Reboud (2003) suggests that removing border rows to trap pollen 













Because transgene escape is inevitable, the possible impacts of transgenes on ecosystems and the likely 
contamination of non-GM producers are significant concerns. Our intention is to help provide another 
opportunity  for public participation in the belief that this  will  help bring about a social consensus on 
agricultural gene technology. One suggested reason for the lack of a social consensus is that agricultural 
gene technology is a ‘technology in search of applications’, that GM crops are an autonomous rather than 
induced innovation (Hacking (1986) in Batie and Ervin 2001). Because autonomous innovations arise out 
of scientific advances rather than consumer or producer demand, they are less likely to be guided by full 
social values. Welsh and Ervin (2006) argue that public participation can generate incentives to develop 
GM crops that reflect social values, such as GM crops with publically identified preferred traits like non-
toxic approaches to pest control. However, the prevalence of herbicide tolerant and insect resistant GM 
crops worldwide suggests such traits will persist even with incentives to develop GM crops outside the 
traditional ‘pesticide paradigm’ of pest control (Welsh and Ervin 2006, p. 168).  
 
There is an opportunity for considering non-scientific concerns without detracting from the scientific risk 
assessment  and  precautionary  approach  specified  by  the  GT  Act.  Johnson  et  al.  (2006)  note  that  the 
outcome of scientific risk assessment is not the only factor on which the decision to allow commercial 
release of GM crops is made. That decision is made based on the acceptable level of risk, a political 
decision that should take into account social values. Focusing on the risk of gene flow from environmental 
release of GM canola, our aim then is to demonstrate the trade-offs between managing the risk of gene flow 
and  the  costs  of  achieving  varying  levels  of  acceptable  risk  for  a  given  margin  of  safety,  using  the 
framework of a probabilistic risk assessment with a safety rule decision mechanism. Both parameters are 
central to public debates over risk regulation, and amount to value-judgements rather than scientific rules: 
Thus, it is important to know the economic impacts of alternative parameter specifications (Haight 1995). 
We hope that this research will provide an opportunity for public participation in the decision-making 
process for approving release of GM crops into the Australian environment; specifically, the choice of the 
acceptable level of risk. 
 
Applications of the safety rule decision mechanism  
 
Even though gene flow  from GM canola is no  more likely than  gene  flow from conventional canola, 
because gene technology makes gene flow across evolutionary barriers possible it presents regulators with 
a novel category of risk. Nevertheless, agricultural gene technology shares some common attributes with 
other technologies that pose environmental risks. This includes a high degree of uncertainty about the 
magnitude of the risks posed that is held in distinct aversion by both regulators and the public. Uncertainty 












mechanism to take into account that uncertainty is vital for environmental decision making. Unlike risky 
decisions in which the decision maker can identify all the possible outcomes and probabilities for each 
management  strategy,  environmental  management  decisions  are  more  often  characterised  by  true 
uncertainty, whereby there is not enough information to identify all outcomes and/or their probabilities of 
occurrence (Marshall et al. 1998). Evaluations of environmental health risk using benefit cost analysis 
ignore  uncertainty  arising  from  stochastic  environmental  effects  when  employing  estimates  based  on 
average risk (Lichtenberg et al. 1989). Traditional probability-based models of risk in decision-making 
such as expected utility may not deal appropriately with uncertainty in environmental decision making or 
be consistent with the management objective. In these cases, policy responses commonly demonstrate an 
aversion to uncertainty and a corresponding desire for a policy approach that is precautionary in nature. For 
example, regulators may be required to undertake to protect health within a minimum standard of safety or 
to ensure population viability of endangered species.  
 
The safety rule decision mechanism corresponds more closely to the terms of environmental legislation that 
require regulators to balance social cost against ensuring adequate protection. The safety rule condition 
specifies that risk be constrained to remain below a given maximum allowable or acceptable level (such as 
a risk standard) within a given margin of safety (Lichtenberg et al. 1989). In the event that the realisation of 
adverse  outcomes  is  uncertain,  regulators  can  act  to  limit  the  frequency  with  which  the  maximum 
acceptable levels of those outcomes are exceeded. 
 
Consider the methodology proposed by Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988), who combine a probabilistic 
health risk assessment with a safety-rule decision mechanism. Uncertainty is a principal characteristic of 
many environmental health problems and consistently an obstacle to developing appropriate policies to 
address  them.  The  authors  define  risk  as  the  probability  that  an  individual  selected  randomly  from  a 
population contracts an adverse health effect. Because the relationship between risk and the variables that 
generate it is not known with certainty, health risk estimates used for policy evaluation are subject to error, 
and uncertainty is defined as a  measure of the  magnitude of this error. Their  methodology takes into 
account this uncertainty by specifying probability distributions for the factors that cause risk, and examines 
the characteristics of the optimal mix of policies for achieving a given risk standard with a given margin of 
safety. The regulator acts to limit the frequency of violations of this predetermined standard; that is, to 
ensure that an adverse outcome exceeds some maximum allowable level no more than an accepted fraction 













The log of overall health risk is 
1
n
i i Y X
= =∑ , where  , 1,..., i X i n =  denote the log of the ith parameter. 
The authors assume that the original parameters have a joint lognormal distribution such that  , 1,..., i X i n =  
have a joint normal distribution.  i X  have mean  i M  and variance 
2
i S , and  i X  and  j X  have covariance 
ij i j i jr S S
≠ ∑ . If the social cost of regulation is  R , then the regulator’s problem is to choose a set of 
policies to minimise  R  subject to the constraint that  { } 0 Pr 1 Y Y P ≥ ≤ − . 
 
If  ( ) Y P  is the level of log risk exceeded with probability  1 P − ,  ( ) F P  is the critical value of the 
standard  normal  distribution  which  is  exceeded  with  probability  1 P − ,  and  ( ) Y P   is  a  normally 
distributed random variable,  ( ) ( ) Y F P Y P EY S =  −    , then  
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∑ ∑ ∑ .     (1) 
 
The constraint that  { } 0 Pr 1 Y Y P ≥ ≤ −  is equivalent to the condition  ( ) 0 Y P Y ≤ , namely  
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The above specification implies that regulatory decisions are based on two parameters: maximum allowable 
log risk  ( ) 0 Y  and the margin of safety  P , which Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988) note are central to 
public debates over risk regulation. Moreover, log risk is expressed as a combination of mean risk and 
uncertainty, where uncertainty is weighted by the constant  ( ) F P . The authors interpret  ( ) F P  as an 
expression of the regulator’s aversion to uncertainty. Setting  1
2 P =   ( ) ( ) 0 F P =  is the equivalent of 
neutrality with respect to log risk, and the higher  P , the larger  ( ) F P  and the greater the weight placed on 
uncertainty. Lichtenberg et al. (1989) argue that this corresponds to a ‘disaster-avoidance’ approach to 
decision-making.  By  focusing  on  unacceptably  bad  outcomes,  this  approach  is  in  line  with  apparent 
regulatory and public preferences.  
 
The  model  has  been  applied  to  groundwater  contamination  (Lichtenberg  et  al.  1989)  and  pesticide 












the safety-rule framework to examine the opportunity costs of health-based restrictions on pesticides in 
groundwater under uncertainty. The regulator acts to minimise the opportunity cost of an environmental 
policy decision, measured as the difference in profit levels with and in the absence of pesticide regulation. 
Profitability levels are based on a protocol using stochastic simulation and mathematical programming 
techniques to describe farming activities. Lichtenberg et al (1989) also consider the instrument choices and 
social costs when the choice of risk standard is no longer exogenous to the analysis, by examining the 
trade-off curve between social cost and risk under any given margin of safety. Trade-off curves are derived 
by solving the cost minimisation problem for every relevant risk standard under a given margin of safety. 
The solution for each risk standard represents the cost-efficient portfolio of policies for that risk standard 
and margin of safety,  ( )
*
0, R Y P . Substitution into the social cost function yields an uncertainty-adjusted 
cost curve for risk reduction,  ( ) 0, R Y P .  
 
Safety-rule decision mechanisms are also used in the literature on conservation planning, such as in Haight 
(1995) and Marshall et al. (1998). Haight (1995) employs a safety-rule decision mechanism in allocating a 
forest  area  between  the  competing  uses  of  timber  production  and  habitat  preservation.  The  decision 
problem  is  to  maximise  the  present  value  of  timber  harvest  revenue  subject  to  maintaining  species 
population  viability.  Because  population  dynamics  during  the  management  period  are  uncertain,  the 
viability constraint is expressed as a safety-rule,  { } Pr N S α < ≤ , where N is population size at the end of 
the management period, S is a predefined target population size, below which the population is subject to 
an  unacceptable  risk  of  extinction,  and  α   is  the  maximum  acceptable  risk  the  standard  will  not  be 
achieved. The margin of safety  ( ) 1 α −  is the minimum acceptable probability of achieving the standard, 
in recognition of the uncertainties in population prediction. Marshall et al. (1998) use the same model form 
to evaluate the trade-offs among the costs of alternative warbler management strategies and the elements S  
and α  of the objective function, where stochastic simulation is used to translate Warbler natural history 
and management parameters into possible distributions of population sizes at the end of the management 
period. 
 
Lichtenberg (2006) has suggested that the safety-rule decision mechanism can be applied to agricultural 
gene  technology  regulation.  He  identifies  three  general  categories  of  (environmental)  risk-generating 
factors of agricultural gene technology: 
•  I , the rate at which the genetically modified organism (GMO) is introduced into the environment, e.g. 












•  F , environmental fate or transport, the rate at which the GMO disseminates through the environment, 
e.g. the movement of pollen or other vectors of genetic material; and 
•  S ,  the  susceptibility  of  relevant  (non-target)  organisms  to  the  GMO,  e.g.  the  presence  of  weedy 
relatives or hybridisation rates. 
 
The incremental environmental risk created by the introduction of potentially dangerous GMOs is modelled 
as the product of these factors,  R I F S = × × , where each factor (and therefore incremental risk R also) is 
subject to uncertainty, and hence a random variable. Incremental environmental risk  R  refers to the risk 
from intentional environmental release 
 
Lichtenberg (2006) categorises policies in the same way as the risk-generating factors: 
•  i x , is the social cost of policies that restrict the introduction of potentially hazardous organisms, e.g. 
planting restrictions and moratoria; 
•  f x  is the social cost of policies attempting to limit the dissemination of genetic material through the 
environment, e.g. setbacks for field transgenic crops, contained facilities for research; and 
•  s x  is the social cost of policies that limit susceptibility, e.g. limiting plantings to areas where the 
transgenic crop has few wild relatives. 
 
Again,  the  regulator  chooses  regulatory  instruments  i x ,  f x   and  s x   to  minimise  the  social  cost 
( ) i f s x x x + +   of  meeting  the  constraint  that  the  probability  of  violations  of  the  nominal  standard 
M (acceptable risk) does not exceed the margin of safety. 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) { } Pr Pr 1 i f s R M I x F x S x M α ≥ = ≥ ≤ −       (3) 
After taking a logarithmic transformation and letting lower-case letters represent natural logarithms, the 
safety-fixed constraint is written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } Pr , , 1 i f s i f s r x x x i x f x s x m α = + + ≥ ≤ − .      (4) 
 
Then, if the three risk-generating factors,  I , F  and S , are lognormal then the constraint can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The necessary condition for any regulatory instrument k  in use ( ) 0 k x >  is given by 











,  , , k i f s = ,      (6) 
where  Σ  denotes  the  standard  deviation  of  the  uncertainty-adjusted  risk  level  ( ) r α , 
( ) ( ) ( )
2
k k k kl k k l l l k x x x τ σ ρ σ σ
≠   = + Σ   ∑   is  risk-generating  factor  ' k s  share  of  total  uncertainty 
about risk, and  [ ][ ] k k k k k x x η σ σ = ∂ ∂  is the elasticity of uncertainty about risk-generating factor  k  
with respect to policy, and  λ  is the shadow price of the constraint and the marginal cost of attaining the 
nominal  standard  m   with  a  margin  of  safety  α .  Lichtenberg  and  Zilberman  (1988)  suggest  that  the 
efficient mix of regulatory policies will be a portfolio of activities, some  with a relative advantage in 
reducing mean risk, and others in reducing uncertainty about risk. 
 
An advantage of the safety-rule mechanism is that decision-making under uncertainty is modelled in an 
obvious way that corresponds closely to environmental legislation and political debate. However, unlike 
benefit-cost analysis, a safety rule mechanism does not directly assess the trade-offs between aggregate 
economic benefits and environmental risks (Harper and Zilberman 1992) or address the distribution of the 
costs  associated  with  regulation.  Nevertheless,  it  is  especially  relevant  to  agricultural  gene  technology 
regulation  and  the  risk  assessment  procedures  undertaken  by  the  Regulator.  The  curves  derived  by 
Lichtenberg et al. (1989) may not directly address the trade-offs between aggregate economic benefit and 
risk  inherent  in  environmental  regulation,  in  the  manner  of  uncertainty-corrected  benefit-cost  analysis 
(Harper and Zilberman 1992). However, they demonstrate the economic impacts of different values of the 
policy parameters the margin of safety,  α , and acceptable risk,  m , in a manner that facilitates public 
debate over their appropriate values, matters central to concerns about Australian regulation of agricultural 




We consider the risk of gene flow from GM canola. Adherents to the precautionary principle have argued 
that environmental release of GM canola (and other GM crops) should be delayed until there is deeper 
understanding of its impact on natural ecosystems, and co-existence with non-GM cropping systems can be 
guaranteed. However, the ACIL Tasman (2007a) report suggests that there are greater costs to Australian 
producers from preventing commercialisation. GM crops have been grown and consumed safely in the 10 
years since commercialisation. Prohibiting commercial production in Australia means foregone agronomic 












organic canola are counterproductive, as there are (at best) minimal premiums to protect, and market access 
is not materially affected.  
 
The agronomic benefits of canola stem from its role in cropping rotations, where it is typically used as a 
break crop in cereal production. Canola is itself profitable, but many of its benefits in production emerge 
when it is followed by wheat. In comparison with wheat-wheat rotations, wheat grown after canola shows 
yield improvements of 20 per cent on average and quality improvements of 1.3 per cent increases in protein 
levels (Norton et al. 1999). In some cases canola is reported to reduce yields in following cereal crops 
because of its high nutrient requirements, and nutrient replacement requirements increase production costs. 
Weed management and herbicide resistance are obstacles to including canola in cropping systems and the 
seeds of Brassica weeds can contaminate canola seed oil. Conventionally bred Triazine-tolerant canola (TT 
canola) provided a management solution when weeds were otherwise intractable in conventional canola 
varieties, but at a yield penalty of 20 per cent and with a reduction in seed oil content of 2 per cent. 
Moreover, some Brassica weeds are showing signs of Triazine-resistance development. Clearfield canola is 
another  conventionally-bred  herbicide  (imidazolinone)  resistant  variety  of  canola,  which  does  have  an 
agronomic advantage over conventional canola. GM canola offers improved weed control, the need for 
fewer tillage passes, and potential yield advantages from earlier sowing and, in the case of InVigor
 canola, 
better canola varieties (Canola Council of Canada 2001). 
 
We propose a probabilistic gene flow risk assessment and safety rule decision mechanism. We consider the 
risk of gene flow from GM canola rather than GM crops as a whole because a case-by-case approach is 
recommended for environmental release of GM crops (Glover 2002; Messeguer 2003), and because canola 
is the subject of considerable scientific assessment of the potential for gene flow. The Regulator maximises 
the joint profit of a GM and non-GM producer given strategies to manage gene flow from GM canola, 
subject to the probabilistic constraint that contamination remains below a threshold value with a given 
margin of safety. Previous applications of  the  safety-rule decision  mechanism  maximise revenue  from 
competing  production  activities  (as  in  Haight  1995)  or  minimise  the  social  costs  of  regulation  (as  in 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1988). Because the problem is concerned with setting (socially acceptable) 
thresholds  for co-existence of GM and non-GM canola, the objective is to  maximise  joint profit of a 
potential GM and non-GM producer, subject to management strategies to limit gene flow from GM canola. 
Profit of the potential GM canola producer is  GM π and  NGM π is profit of the non-GM canola producer. The 
threshold value is initially assumed to be the contamination threshold for labelling as GM or non-GM. 
 
Profitability  levels  are  determined  based  on  Willett  and  Willett’s  (2007)  protocol  that  uses  stochastic 












follows. The GM and non-GM producers’ problem is to choose a canola variety to maximise farm profit. 
Let index  ( ) 1,2 k k =  denote the production system technology. Willett and Willett (2007) designate land 
according to hydraulic soil groups as they are concerned with pesticide contamination of groundwater. We 
instead define production systems according to whether they are a certified GM-free ( ) 1 k =  (for example, 
organic canola) or a conventional production  system  ( ) 2 k = . Let index   ( ) 1,..., i i I =  denote canola 
variety. We assume that conventional production systems can grow conventional  ( ) 1 i = , conventionally-
bred herbicide tolerant  ( ) 2 i =  or GM canola varieties  ( ) 3 i = . Organic or certified GM-free production 
systems ( ) 1 i =  do not adopt GM canola. We define the following notations: 
 
ik P ≡  Price of canola variety i  under production system k ;  
ik φ ≡ Yield of canola variety i  under production system k ; 
ik s ≡  Seed costs/technology fee per hectare for canola variety i  under production system k ;  
ik h ≡ Herbicide cost per hectare for canola variety  i  under production system  k  (including application 
costs); 
ik c ≡  Production costs per hectare for canola variety i  under production system k ;  
ik L ≡ Hectares of land under production system k  used to produce canola variety i ; 
k L ≡ Hectares of land under production system k  available; and  
ik τ ≡  Per hectare profit margin for canola variety i  under production system k . 
 
The second component of the model is the constraint that the probability of gene flow from GM canola 
does  not  exceed  the  acceptable  level  within  a  margin  of  safety.  Lichtenberg  (2006)  defines  risk, 
R IFS = .This specification of risk as the product of the random variables  I ,F , and  S , follows from the 
models of (human) health risk from environmental contaminants such as pesticides. Instead, we employ 
Damgaard and Kjellsson’s (2005) model of canola gene flow. They estimate the probability of foreign 
pollination from a GM donor field in a recipient (non-GM) field as a function of separation distance, buffer 
zone, and recipient field width by a meta-analysis of Australian, EU and North American field trial data. 
They model two effects: Ga, the effect of dilution of foreign/GM pollen in the recipient field, and Gn, the 
effect of distance between the GM and non-GM fields. The average probability of foreign pollination with 












  ( )
1 X
a a Z G g x dx
X Z
=
− ∫ ,  (7) 
where:  
X =  The width of the recipient field, measured as a perpendicular transect from the border with the GM 
donor field; 
Z =  The width of the buffer zone, which is not harvested as GM-free; and 
( ) a g x =  Models the decrease in the probability of foreign pollination at distance  x from the common 
border. This is described by an exponentially decreasing function of distance  x: 
  ( )
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= The expected proportion of foreign pollination at the border of two adjacent fields; 
1 θ =  The proportion of seeds resulting from self-pollination. The remaining proportion of seeds results 
from equal amounts of pollination from the donor and recipient fields; and 
d = A transition point where the relatively fast decrease in the probability of foreign pollination is reduced 
from  2n θ  to  2 f θ . That is, most canola pollen is found within 10m of its source (Salisbury 2002).   
 
Damgaard and Kjellsson (2005) define the average probability of foreign pollination when the donor and 
recipient fields are non-adjacent, Gn, as: 
  ( ) 3 4 exp n G Y θ θ = − ,  (9) 
where: 
3 θ = The average probability of foreign pollination if the two fields were adjacent; 
4 θ =Measures  the  decrease  in  the  average  probability  of  foreign  pollination  with  increasing  distance 
between the fields; and 
Y = Distance between non-adjacent fields. 
 
Damgaard and Kjellsson (2005) use the data points of the field trials to determine the Bayesian posterior 
distribution of the parameters, with  3 d = . The distribution of Ga is found by random sampling of the joint 












distribution of  3 θ  and  4 θ . As Ga and Gn are assumed to be independent, the combined effect of dilution of 
foreign pollen and distance between fields is found by multiplying Ga and Gn together (Damgaard 2008). 
 
We define the following variables for management of gene flow from GM canola: 
ik X ≡  Field width (in meters) for canola variety i  under production system k ;  
ik Y ≡  Separation distance (in meters) for canola variety i  under production system k ;  
ik Z ≡  Buffer zone width (in meters) for recipient field for canola variety i  under production system k ; 
ik W ≡  Length (in meters) of the field border for canola variety i  under production system k ; 
ik ω ≡  Volunteer management costs for canola variety i  under production system k ;  
k M ≡  Threshold value for percentage foreign pollination in recipient field under production system  k ; 
and 
α ≡ Margin of safety for the level of gene flow out of land type k  ( ) 0 1 α < < .  
Also:  
Define  the  profit  margin  per  hectare  of  canola  variety  i   under  production  system  k , 
ik ik ik ik ik ik P s h c φ τ ≡ − − − ; and 
. ik ik ik L W X = . 
 
For the case of a GM producer and a certified non-GM producer, joint profit is: 










≤ ∑ ,    1,2 k =           (11) 
{ } { } 11 11 , 1 . Pr Pr 1 a n k k k G R M G M α = ≥ = ≥ ≤ −     2 k =       (12) 
 
The  objective  function  (10)  is  the  joint  profit  of  the  GM  and  certified  non-GM  producers.  Without 
management strategies to restrict average probability of foreign pollination, joint profit is  32 32 11 11 L L τ τ + . 
Separation distances reduce the area planted to GM crops by  32 32 . W Y . Canola grown in buffer zones can 
still  be  harvested  and  sold  at  the  GM  price.  Equation  (11)  sets  restrictions  on  land  availability.  The 












production system remain below a threshold value,  k M , with a margin of safety, α . As seen in (7) to (9), 
average probability of foreign pollination depend on  11 X ,  11 Z  and  32 Y . 
 
Some previous simulation results 
 
Without commercial release, information on GM canola in Australian production systems is restricted to 
field trials and estimates. The most recent investigation into the economic impacts of adopting GM crops is 
the ACIL Tasman report commissioned by the Victorian Department of Primary Industries as part of the 
review of the Victorian moratorium on GM crops (ACIL Tasman 2007b). Their report details cost-benefit 
estimates of the impact of the GM canola moratorium and includes gross margin analysis of three varieties 
of GM canola, two varieties of conventionally-bred herbicide tolerant canola and conventional canola. The 
expected performance of the six canola production systems is the basis of the assumptions for yields, seed 
oil content, prices of the varieties, and input costs. Table 1 details some of the assumed varietal impacts. 
 
Table 1: Assumed varietal impacts  
Impact                                       Canola Variety 











Relative Differences (%) 
Yield  100  95  100  100  120  120 
Grain Prices  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Seed Cost  100  100  100  100  150  150 
Absolute Differences (%) 
Oil Content  42  42  42  42  44  44 
Technology 
Fee ($/ha) 
0  0  0  25  60  0 
(ACIL Tasman 2007b) 
 
Monsanto report from their Roundup Ready
 canola trials (in ACIL Tasman 2007b) that the Roundup 
Ready canola variety gives gross margins 20 per cent higher than conventional canola varieties due to 
higher yields and lower input costs. However, a Clearfield non-GM variety had significantly higher yields 
than  the  Roundup  Ready
  and  other  non-GM  varieties.  Bayer  CropScience  trials  of  InVigor
  canola 
varieties report yield advantages of between 9 and 38 per cent. Conversely, ACIL Tasman (2007a) report 
that  Finney  (2003)  finds  conventional  canola  production  systems  generate  higher  gross  margins  than 
Roundup Ready
, InVigor












per cent over conventional canola for Roundup Ready
 and InVigor
, respectively. Growing costs for 
Roundup Ready
  were 97 per cent of conventional canola costs and InVigor
  had additional costs of 
$28/ha for seed and $54/ha for using Liberty
 herbicide. However, ACIL Tasman (2007a) note that identity 
preservation  costs  of  12.5  per  cent  of  the  grain  value  influenced  this  outcome.  If  instead  the  identity 
preservation costs were set at 10 per cent consistent with other estimates, then InVigor
 canola generates a 
higher gross margin. 
 
Other on-farm impacts on gross margins of GM canola compared with non-GM canola, averaged across the 
report’s 2003-2016 projection period, include: a $93 increase in income; a $48 increase in seed/technology 
access costs; a $19 decrease in chemical costs; a $27 increase in fertiliser costs; an $11 decrease in other 
management costs (including sowing, spray applications, windrowing and harvesting); and a $2 increase in 
off-farm  transport.  The  report  finds  that  on  average  non-GM  canola  varieties  have  a  gross  margin 
approximately  $45  lower  than  for  the  three  GM  varieties  across  the  projection  period  (ACIL  Tasman 
2007b). Other data requirements include similar gross margin analyses of canola in organic production 
systems. 
 
The parameter values in the models of the effect of foreign pollen dilution,  a G , and the effect of distance 
between fields,  n G , were estimated by Damgaard and Kjellsson (2005). Estimated values for  3 d =  are: 
1 ˆ 0.84 θ = ;  2 ˆ 0.43 n θ = ;  2 ˆ 0.07 f θ = ; 
3
3 ˆ 5.87 10 θ
− = × ; and 
3
4 ˆ 6.01 10 θ
− = × .   
 
In the pipeline 
 
At  this  stage  our  model  has  several  serious  omissions,  which  we  intend  to  address.  First,  we  have 
considered two farms, whereas our research objective requires industry wide consideration of the trade-offs 
between managing gene flow from GM canola and the cost of achieving a given standard within a margin 
of  safety.  This  would  also  require  assumptions  about  potential  adoption  rates.  We  have  also  only 
considered a single period, whereas a more useful assessment would consider a longer period so as to take 
into account inter temporal gene flow. For example, an additional source of foreign pollen is volunteer GM 
canola plants from earlier seasons. A further consideration is the impact of GM canola on subsequent 
cropping rotations. For example, Roundup Ready
 canola has resulted in higher yields in following wheat 
(ACIL Tasman 2007b). One impact that is beyond the scope of this research is inclusion of environmental 
impacts of GM canola. Although estimates exist of changes in pesticide active ingredient applications and 
changes in pesticide toxicity (for example, Brookes and Barfoot 2006), estimates of the monetary value of 















We have presented a tentative framework to assess the trade-offs between managing gene flow from GM 
canola and the costs of keeping the average probability of foreign pollination below a given acceptable 
level with a margin of safety. We have considered here only a GM producer and a certified non-GM 
producer. However, when the framework is extended to consider industry trade-offs, the results can be an 
input  in  public  debates  over  the  value  of  the  parameter  acceptable  risk.  Acceptable  risk  is  a  policy 
parameter that should reflect social values, and in this way this study will potentially facilitate achievement 
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